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Abstract
In 1978, Gareth Evans published a short and somewhat cryptic
article purporting to establish that there are no vague objects. This
paper is a commentary on this. Prima facie, the claim that there
are no vague objects is clearly false. Mt Everest, for example, has no
precise boundaries. And if this is so, there must be something wrong
with Evans’ argument. In the paper, I discuss what this is, giving a
model of vague objects in the process.
1 Introduction
In 1978, Gareth Evans published a short and somewhat cryptic article pur-
porting to establish that there are no vague objects.1 The paper generated
a small literature.2 This essay is a somewhat belated contribution to it.
Prima facie, the claim that there are no vague objects is clearly false.
None of the following has precise boundaries: Mt. Everest, the Coral Sea,
the European feudal epoch, the period of Medieval philosophy.3 And if
this is so, there must be something wrong with Evans’ argument. In what
follows, I will give a model of vague objects, and so diagnose what is wrong
with it.
1Evans (1979).
2For an introduction to this, see Keefe and Smith (1996), pp. 52-56.
3In this essay, I do not argue that there really are vague objects in re. But these
examples certainly seem to be so: their boundaries in space and time are indeterminate.
So they at least put the onus of proof on those who claim that they are not. The main point
of the paper is to argue that Evans’ argument does not discharge this onus. Could there
be vague objects other than those with spatio-temporal boundaries? Perhaps. Maybe
some abstract objects, such as symphonies, proofs, and even essays, such as this.
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2 Evans’ Argument
Let us start with Evans’ argument. First, some terminology. Let us use the
following symbols with the given glosses:
• A := It is determinately true that A
• ∆A := A ∨¬A (It is determinate whether A)
• ∇A := ¬∆A = ¬A ∧ ¬¬A (It is indeterminate whether A)4
Evans’ argument now goes as follows:5
• Suppose that ∇a = b
• ∆a = a (since a = a)
• So ¬∇a = a
• So a 6= b
It ends there. This leaves us with two puzzles. The first is what, exactly,
we are supposed to have proved. This argument is clearly meant to be some
kind of reductio of the supposition. So Evans appears to be assuming that
a 6= b → ¬∇a = b.6 But why should we suppose this? This is the claim
that a 6= b→ a = b∨a 6= b. If it is false that a = b then it cannot be the
case that a = b is determinately true; so presumably we have to assume that
a 6= b → a 6= b. This isn’t exactly the question-begging a = b → a = b,
but the two would seem to stand or fall together. Moreover, there are
accounts of vagueness where the principle A→ A fails quite generally.7
Evans gestures at a way of bringing the argument to a formal contra-
diction, by assuming that the logic of  is S5. The argument is not spelled
out, but presumably it is something like the following. We have just shown
that:
4Evans calls ∇ the dual of ∆, but the terminology is somewhat aberrant. It would be
normal to call ¬∆¬ the dual of ∆. ∇ is simply the negation.
says that ∆ and ∇ are duals. This is not correct. The dual of ∆A is ¬∆¬A, not ∇A.
However, if we assume the law of double negation, ¬∆¬A is equivalent to ∇A.
5This is a slightly simplified version. Evans’ actual argument is more complicated,
using lambda abstractions. For reasons I will explain in fn. 13, the extra complication
buys nothing.
6Note that one cannot simply infer a 6= b (and so ¬∇a = b) from a 6= b by Necessi-
tation, since the argument for a 6= b depends on an assumption.
7E.g., that of Field (2003).
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• ∇a = b |= a 6= b
• So ∇a = b |= a 6= b
• In S58 ∇a = b |= ∇a = b
• So ∇a = b |= a 6= b
• But a 6= b |= ∆a = b
• That is, a 6= b |= ¬∇a = b
• So ∇a = b |= ¬∇a = b
• Hence |= ¬∇a = b
There are grounds to doubt that the logic of  is S5. We will come to these
in due course. For the moment, let us set this matter aside.
The second problem is this. Let us assume that we have shown that
¬∇a = b, that is, ∆a = b: all identities are determinate. How does that
show that there are no vague objects? Presumably the thought is that
vague objects will give rise to indeterminate identities. But this is not at
all obvious. We might say that two objects are the same if any way of
precisifying one precisifies the other; and two objects are distinct if there
is a way of precisifying one but not the other. (A precise object has, by
definition, only one precisification.) Thus, Australia is not New Holland;9
but Sagarmāthā is Chomolungma.10 Such identities are determinate, since
they are not hostage to the vicissitudes of precisification. Hence, with such
truth conditions, vague objects do not give rise to indeterminate identities.
However, let us set this matter aside for the moment also.
For as is clear, the core of the argument itself is simply an application
of the distinctness of discernibles:
• Ax(a),¬Ax(b) |= a 6= b
where, note, A contains ∇. This is just a contraposed version of the indis-
cernibility of identicals (SI): a = b, Ax(a) |= Ax(b). So when all the frills
8∇A |= ¬A∧¬¬A. By S5 principles, ∇A |= ¬A∧¬¬A. So ∇A |= (¬A∧
¬¬A). That is, ∇a = b |= ∇a = b.
9‘New Holland’ is the name that early European explorers called the Australian land
mass. At the time, the existence of Tasmania was unknown.
10When the Nepalese gazed at the peak which Europeans were later to call Mt Everest,
they called it Sagarmāthā. When the Tibetans gazed at the same peak from the other
side of the Himalayas, the called it Chomolungma.
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are stripped off, this is just a determinacy analogue of an old modal friend:
the necessity of identities: a = b |= a = b (since a = a).11 This principle
fails in modal logics of so called contingent identity,12 which will therefore
invalidate Evans’ argument. Let us see how.13
3 Contingent Identity
Actually, it’s not clear that the determinacy- is a modal operator. There
are certainly accounts of vagueness in which borderline cases are neither
true nor false.14 So, A is true iff A is true; ∆A is true iff A is either true
or false; and ∇A is true iff A is neither true nor false. Hence the inference
A ` A is valid, and  is not modal operator.
What happens to Evans’ argument in this case? If the logic is something
like Strong Kleene15 and identity behaves normally, a = b,∆a = a |= ∆a =
b. (The second premise is, in fact, redundant.) However, the contraposed
form fails: ¬∆a = b,∆a = a |= a 6= b. (If a = b is neither true nor false,
the premises are true, but not the conclusion.) So Evans’ argument fails
because of this.16
But set all this aside as well, and let us assume that the determinacy-
is a modal operator, and give it a world-semantics.
11See, e.g., Kripke (1971).
12See, e.g., Priest (2008), ch. 17. This contains further details of the semantics of
the next section. There, I simply identity an element in the domain with its precisifying
function.
13There is one frill of Evans’ argument on which I have not so far commented. Evans’
actual formulation of the argument employs λ-terms and λ-conversion, moving from ∇a =
b to [λx∇a = x]b, and ¬∇a = a to ¬[λx∇a = x]a, before applying the distinctness of
discernibles. This just hides the fact that what is at issue is simply whether, if a = b,
the first can be substituted for the second in modal contexts. To understand why, one
needs to think about the semantics of λ-terms. A simple approach to these is to take the
extension of the predicate [λyA(y)]x (or the property which it denotes) at world w to be
the extension of the formula A(x) at w. Given this, λ-conversion is certainly satisfied. But
just because of this coextensionality, if SI fails for x = a, it fails equally for [λyy = a]x.
Of course, this may fairly be taken to show that predication by the λ-term is not de re
predication, as Evans surely intended. To ensure that it is de re predication, the extension
of [λyA(y)]x at world w has to be (equivalent to) ∃y(y = x ∧ A(y)) at w—the reference
being obtained by the external scope quantifier. But now λ-conversion in one direction
(the one invoked in contraposed form in the argument) presupposes SI. For [λxA(x)]a
then entails ∃y(y = a ∧A(y)); and SI is required to move to A(a).
14E.g., Tye (1994).
15See Priest (2008), ch. 7.
16See Priest (2008), 21.9.
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Take a first-order language with identity, , and, for simplicity, no func-
tion symbols. We may think of ∨,→, ∃,♦ as defined in the usual way, and
∆ and ∇ as defined as above.
An interpretation is a structure 〈W,R,D,H, π, δ〉. W is a set of “worlds”.
Intuitively, these are situations at which we arrive when we precisify things.
R is the universal accessibility relation. That is: for all w,w′ ∈W , wRw′.
H is a certain domain of objects. D is the domain of quantification.
For every d ∈ D, π(d) is a map from W to H. Intuitively, it specifies the
precisification of d at w. I will write π(d)(w) as |d|w.17
If c is any constant, δ(c) ∈ D, and if Pn is any n-place predicate symbol,
δ(Pn) is a function from worlds to a subset of H
n. Let us write δ(Pn)(w) as
δw(Pn). One may think of this as the precisification of Pn at w.
18
The truth conditions for atomic sentences are:19
• w  Pc1...cn iff 〈|δ(c1)|w , ..., |δ(cn)|w〉 ∈ δw(Pn)
If the extension of a predicate is the same at all worlds of an interpretation,
it has only one precisification, and so is precise. The extension of identity is
given, as is to be expected, by: δw(=) = {〈h, h〉 : h ∈ H}. Hence, identity
is a precise predicate.
The truth conditions for the logical operators are as usual in S5. For
the quantifiers, we assume that the language has been augmented with a
constant, cd, for every d ∈ D, such that δ(cd) = d. Then we have:
• w  ¬A iff w 6 A
• w  A ∧B iff w  A and w  B
• w  ∀xA iff for all d ∈ D, w  Ax(cd)
• w  A iff for all w′ ∈W, such that wRw′, w′  A
17As a referee observed, one could simply take H to be {h : ∃d ∈ D ∃w ∈ W h = |d|w}.
Members of H not of this form have no effect on the semantics.
18I note that if we wished, we could introduce a domain of properties and relations, and
let δ map each n-place predicate to an n-place relation. π could then map each member of
that domain to its precisification at world w. What I now write as δw(Pn) would then be
|δ(Rn)|w, where Rn is the n-ary relation referred to by Pn. This would give us a theory
of vague properties. However, this is not required here, since the language is first-order.
19Perhaps the place where one is most likely to meet contingent identity semantics is in
connection with “4-dimensionalism”. There, the indices of evaluation are times, t, and
an object, d, is a 4-dimensional “worm”. |d|t is the temporal part of d at t. Then, for
example, ‘Socrates is sitting’ is true at time t iff the temporal part of Socrates at time t
is in the extension of ‘is sitting’ at time t.
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Validity is defined as truth preservation at all worlds of all interpretations.
Ignoring identity, the modal logic is that of constant-domain S5.20 For
identity, a simple induction, left as an exercise, proves that if A contains no
modal operators, a = b, Ax(a) |= Ax(b). However, SI fails in modal contexts:
a = b,a = a 6|= a = b. a = a is true at every world, so we may ignore
this. As a counter-example, take an interpretation, with worlds, w and w′,
such that |δ(a)|w = |δ(b)|w but |δ(a)|w′ 6= |δ(b)|w′ . Then a = b is true at w,
but false at w′. Hence a = b is false at w.
In particular, then, Evans’ argument fails. Indeed, there are interpreta-
tions where ∇a = b, that is, ¬a = b∧¬¬a = b, that is, ♦a 6= b∧♦a = b,
is true at some worlds. The interpretation just described is one such.21
4 Global Predicates
Though SI fails in the contingent-identity semantics, it is possible to for-
mulate an enthymematic version. Let us add a new monadic predicate, C,
to the language. Intuitively, Cx expresses the fact that π(x) is a constant
function. One may take it to express the thought that x is a precise object,
since it has only one precisification.
The truth conditions of the predicate are as follows:
• w  Cc iff for all w1, w2 ∈W , |δ(c)|w1 = |δ(c)|w2
It is easy to check that if Ca, Cb, and a = b, are true at a world of some
interpretation, then a = b is true at every world. It follows easily that
20See Priest (2008), ch. 14.
21In an interpretation there can be distinct members of D with the same set of pre-
cisifications. It is very natural to suppose that the objects in question are really the
same. This can be imposed as an extra constraint on interpretations. Specifically, con-
sider the equivalence relation, ∼, on members of D. d1 ∼ d2 iff ∀w1∃w2 |d1|w1 = |d2|w2
and ∀w2∃w1 |d2|w2 = |d1|w1 . Then consider the constraint, C: for all d1, d2 ∈ D (if
d1 ∼ d2 then d1 = d2). Nothing in this paper changes if we we require all interpretations
to satisfy constraint C. In particular, the counter-model just given can be found in such
an interpretation.
In fact, adding the constraint does not change the consequence relation. If truth is
preserved in all interpretations, it is preserved in all constrained interpretations. Con-
versely, if something fails in an interpretation, it fails in a constrained interpretation. To
see this, take any interpretation, and for every d ∈ D, add a new member, hd, to H. Then
for every d ∈ D, choose some world, w. Let |d|w be h. Then extend the extension of
every predicate with the n-tuple which can be obtained by replacing every occurrence of
h with hd. Finally, change π so that |d|w is not h, but hd. In the modified interpretation
every member of D has a precisification that no other member of D has. So condition C
is satisfied. But a simple induction shows that the same things are true in the original
interpretation and the modified interpretation.
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Ca,Cb, a = b |= a = b, and, more generally, that Ca,Cb, a = b, Ax(a) |=
Ax(b), for arbitrary A.
In §2 I noted that vague objects do note necessarily give rise to indetermi-
nate identities. We can now make that thought precise, since ∆a = b 6|= Ca.
(Let a and b denote the same non-constant function.)
= is not the notion of identity given in §2. However, one may add yet
another global predicate to the language, ≡, which expresses this.22 One
might think of this as identity simpiciter, as opposed to identity-at-a-world.
• w  c1 ≡ c2 iff δ(c1) = δ(c2)
If w  c1 ≡ c2 then, for all w′, |δ(c1)|w′ = |δ(c2)|w′ . A simple induction
(left as an exercise) shows that a ≡ b, Ax(a) |= Ax(b), and, in particular,
that a ≡ b |= a ≡ b. Moreover, a 6≡ b |= a 6≡ b. Thus, there are no
indeterminate identities of this kind: |= ∆a ≡ b.
Given Evans’ ruminations, it might be thought that this shows that
there are no vague objects, but this is not so. The determinacy of this
notion of identity notwithstanding, it remains the case that some members
of the domain have a single precisification, and so are precise, and some of
them have more than one, and so are vague. In particular, it is still the
case that ∆a ≡ b 6|=Ca. (Take δ(a) and δ(b) to be the same, π(δ(a)) to be a
non-constant function.)
Indeed, there is just no way to rescue the argument whatever one does,
simply because there are models with vague objects; that is, ds for which
π(d) is not constant.
5 Truth Simpliciter
The semantics of §3 define truth-with-respect-to-a-precisification; but what
about truth simpliciter? What does it mean to say Mt Everest is in the
Himalayas (period)? A natural suggestion is that this is true iff it is true
with respect to all precisifications, i.e., determinately true. If Σ is a set of
sentences, let Σ = {A : A ∈ Σ}. The consequence relation for truth
preservation, |=, may then be defined thus: Σ |= A is Σ |= A.23
22Ordinary predicates of the language may be termed local. To see whether they apply
at a world, one need only consult the goings-on at that world. By contrast, to see whether
C and ≡ apply, one has to consult other worlds. We may call such a predicates global. (In
this sense, the truth functions are local, but the modal operators are global.)
23In an obvious sense, this is a supervaluation semantics; and like all such semantics, it
will have non-classical consequences in the multiple-conclusion version of the logic. Thus,
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SI fails for |= in modal contexts; but as we have seen, a = b, Ax(a) |=
Ax(b), for all contexts, A. Hence, a = b, Ax(a) |= Ax(b). So it might be
thought that the Evans argument goes through using |= as the consequence
relation. It does not. The reason is that |= does not contrapose. As is
easy to check, A |= A (that is, A |= A), but it is not the case that
¬A |= ¬A (that is, ¬A |= ¬A). In particular, even though:
• [¬∇a = a, ] a = b |= ¬∇a = b
we do not have:
• [¬∇a = a, ] ∇a = b |= a 6= b
as a simple counter-model shows.24 Indeed, it is not the case that |= ¬∇a =
b, that is, |= ¬∇a = b. For this would entail that |= ¬∇a = b, which we
know to be false.
A final note on |=. In any normal modal logic, if Σ |= A then Σ |= A.
That is, |= is a subrelation of |=. In the logic K, they are identical. For
suppose that Σ 6|= A. Take a counter-model. Then there is a world, w, in
this where all the members of Σ are true, and A is false. Construct a new
interpretation which is the same, except that it adds a world, w′, which
accesses w and only w. Then every member of Σ is true at w′, and A
is not. Hence Σ 6|= A. However, in general, |= is a proper subrelation.
Consider the logic Kτ . Then A 6|= A; but A |= A. That is, A |= A.
Bounding on the other side, if the logic contains A→ A, then Σ |= A,
that is Σ |= A, entails Σ |= A. In general, this is a proper subrelation.
Thus, in Kρ, A 6|= A; that is A 6|= A. But A |= A. i.e., A |=
A. However, if the logic also contains A → A then the relations are
identical. For:
Σ |= A ⇒ Σ |= A
⇒ Σ |= A
⇒ Σ |= A
A ∨B 6|= A,B. Another way to define truth simpliciter is truth at some precisification.
The consequence relation, Σ |=♦ A, is now ♦Σ |= ♦A. This is a sort of subvaluational or
discussive logic. (On subvaluations, see Priest (2008) 7.10.5b-7.10.5d. On discussive logic,
see Priest (2002), 4.2) This consequence relation has features dual to the supervaluational
one. For example, A,B 6|=♦ A ∧B.
24The interpretation at the end of §3 will do. This makes ∇a = b true at every world,
so ∇a = b holds at every world. But a 6= b fails at some worlds, so a 6= b fails at all
worlds.
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6 Higher Order Indeterminacy
Until now we have assumed (with Evans) that the modal logic of  is S5. In
particular, it validates A→ A and ¬A→ ¬A, which rule out any
indeterminacy in determinacy. It is natural, however, to suppose that there
is such a thing as higher order vagueness, so that these principles should not
be valid. We can, of course, remove them by moving to a weaker logic, and,
in particular, by making the accessibility relation, R, weaker. But how to
do this in a principled way?
First, we suppose that in any interpretation, each local n-place predicate,
P , comes with inner and outer bounds, P I and PO. These mark the limits
of how much P may vary when it is precisified. That is, for any world, w:
• P I ⊆ |δ(P )|w ⊆ PO ⊆ Hn
Such is a natural enough thought. Suppose that P is ‘is red’. One can
precisify this by drawing the line amongst objects that are borderline red.
But the cut must include all clearly red objects: these are all in the inner
bound. And it must exclude all the things that are clearly not red (blue,
green, etc): these are beyond the outer bound.
Next, note that these limits of precisification, as specified, are crisp sub-
sets of Hn. They set rigid boundaries to the limits of variation (modulo
a given interpretation). This is exactly what higher order vagueness rules
out. The bounds of variation are themselves subject to precisification, and
so may change from world to world. In other words, we need to assume that
the inner and outer bounds are themselves world-dependent. Let us write






. The conditions on worlds








We may now use the bounds to define an appropriate accessibility rela-
tion. Namely, for every w,w′ ∈W :
R: wRw′ iff for every P ,
∣∣P I ∣∣
w
⊆ |δ(P )|w′ ⊆
∣∣PO∣∣
w
In other words, the precisification at w′ is within the bounds set by w. If
the bounds on precisification set by w are not respected in w′, then the
precisification of w′ will not be a legitimate one for w.
What is going on here, technically, is that the accessibility relation is
dropped from an interpretation. Instead, the interpretation comes with a
pair of functions, I and O, which map every world, w, and n-place predicate,
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. δ is then constrained by
the condition P; and the accessibility relation R is defined by condition R.
Thus defined, R is clearly reflexive (so |= A→ A). But it need not be
transitive. For suppose that the range of a monadic predicate is a subset of
the reals, and that the inner bound, extension, and outer bound, of some
monadic predicate, P , are the left-hand sides of Dedekind cuts. Suppose,
further, that P is the only predicate relevant in defining R. (All the other
predicates, we may suppose, satisfy the defining condition of R, for all w
and w′. This can be done by making their bounds world-invariant.) Finally,
suppose that there are three worlds where the cuts are as follows:
Inner bound Extension Outer bound
w1 −2 0 +2
w2 −4 1 +4
w3 −6 3 +6
As is easy to check: w1Rw2, w2Rw3, but it is not the case that w1Rw3.
Moreover, the same example shows that R need not be Euclidean (that
is, it is not the case that if xRy and xRz then yRz). For w2Rw1 and w2Rw3,
but it is not the case that w1Rw3.
Hence, given that the accessibility relation, R, is defined in this way, the
logic does not verify the higher-order-excluding A → A and ¬A →
¬A.
I note that none of this affects the failure of the substitutivity of iden-
ticals relevant to the Evans argument. The counter-models we had are, in
effect, just special cases, where the bounds may be taken as world-invariant,
making R the universal relation. Indeed, moving to the weaker logic pro-
vides another reason why Evans’ argument fails, since his attempt to fill in
the gap of his argument (see §2), uses S5 essentially.
7 Two Objections
The vicissitudes of higher order vagueness notwithstanding, the contingent
identity semantics gives us a model of vague objects. The objects are the
members, d, of D, and |d|w is a precisification of d in situation w. In this
final section, I will consider two objections to the effect that these semantics
do not really deliver a semantics of vague objects.
The first objection is to the effect that in giving the truth conditions of
predication, it is the members of H, not of D, which are deployed. Hence
the “ontological commitment” of the semantics is to these, and these are
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precise.25 In reply to this, two points are relevant. First, the fact that Pa is
true in a precisification iff the precisification of a is in the precisification of
P there, in no way shows that a itself is not real. Indeed, the precisifications
are precisifications of something, namely, a. Note that the quantifiers in our
language range over the objects in D, not H. Secondly, even if the only
ontologically real things were the members of H, it does not follow that the
world contains no vague objects. The construction is neutral with respect
to the question of whether the precisifications are themselves completely
precise. Thus, one might think that the shoreline of mainland Australia
provides a precisification of New Holland. But that boundary is itself vague,
due to tides, etc. One may take the denizens of H to be completely precise,
subject to no further precisification; but nothing in the construction requires
this. Indeed, there is no reason why H should not be a subset of D, so that
its members may themselves have more than one precisification.
The second objection takes off from a paper by David Lewis which com-
ments on Evans’ argument.26 There, he suggests a way of interpreting the
argument as a defence of the view that there are no vague objects. Lewis,
too, balks at the application of SI, but for a quite different reason. Names
may refer to different things in different precisifications. They are not, then,
rigid designators. As is well known, SI fails for non-rigid designators in
modal contexts.27 Thus, let n be an abbreviation of ‘the number of plan-
ets’. Then it may be true that n = 8, and that 8 = 8. It is not true that
8 = n. Now, if this is what is going on in Evans’ argument,28 it means
that names are being precisified, not objects. Hence, vagueness is simply in
language, not in the objects that the language refers to.
One might suppose that one can object to my account of vague objects
in re by making the same point. After all, one might think, given a name,
what it refers to is different at every world, so it is changing its denotation.
This is not correct, though. For the names in the language are rigid: at
every world, they refer to exactly the same things: members of D. (That
is, for names, δ is not world-relativised.) The difference between rigid and
non-rigid designators shows up in their logic.29 Thus, if a is not a rigid
designator, the inference Pa ` ∃xPx is invalid. The fact that at every
25Max Cresswell suggested to me that one may see some of Quine’s objections to Car-
nap’s notion of intentional objects—which are, similarly, functions from worlds to ob-
jects—in this way.
26Lewis (1988).
27See, e.g., Priest (2008), 16.4.
28Burgess (1989) argues very plausibly that it is not.
29See Priest (2008), 17.2.13.
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world the denotation of ‘a’ has the property P does not show that there
is some one thing that does so at all worlds: the denotation of ‘a’ may
change from world to world. By contrast, as it easy to check, this inference
is perfectly valid in the semantics of §3. Finally, and in any case, though
the precisification function, π, may induce a precisification of names, it is a
function on objects (members of D), not names.30
8 Conclusion
What we have seen, then, is that the semantics give us a way of under-
standing vague objects. Their vagueness is constituted precisely by the fact
that they can be precisified in different ways. (One could, after all, pre-
cisify Mt Everest by constructing any number of different fences around it.)
And the semantics highlights a central failing of Evans’ argument, to boot:
substitutivity in modal contexts.31
References
[1] Burgess, J. (1989), ‘Evans Misrepresented’, Analysis 49: 112-119.
[2] Evans, G. (1978), ‘Can There Be Vague Objects?’, Analysis 38: 208;
reprinted as ch. 17 of Keefe and Smith (1996).
[3] Field, H. (2003), ‘No Fact of the Matter’, Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy 81: 457-480.
[4] Keefe, R., and Smith P. (eds.) (1996), Vagueness: a Reader, Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
[5] Kripke, S. (1971), ‘Identity and Necessity’, pp. 135-64 of M. Munitz
(ed.), Identity and Individuation, New York, NY: NYU Press; reprinted
30Compare how precisification works with respect to predicates in these semantics. See
fn 18.
31Versions of this paper were given as talks at a meeting of the Australasian Associ-
ation for Logic (Adelaide, July 2017), Syracuse University (September 2017), Princeton
University (April 2018), University of St Andrews (April 2018), the National Autonomous
University of Mexico (September 2018), and the conference ManyVal 2019, Universityof
Bucharest (November 2019). I am grateful to the members of the audiences for help-
ful comments, and especially to Axel Barteló, JC Beall, Aaron Cotnoir, Max Cresswell,
André Gallois, Katherine Hawley, Lloyd Humberstone, Bruno Jacinto, Mark Johnston,
Boris Kment, Harvey Lederman, Daniel Nolan, and Stephen Read. Finally, thanks go to
an anonymous referee of the journal.
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:3) 2021, Article no. 1
105
as ch. 2 of S. P. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds,
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
[6] Lewis, D. (1988), ‘Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood’, Analysis 48:
128-130; reprinted as ch. 18 of Keefe and Smith (1996).
[7] Priest, G. (2002), ‘Paraconsistent Logic’, pp. 287-393, vol. 6, of D. Gab-
bay and F. Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd edn,
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
[8] Priest, G. (2008), Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[9] Tye, M. (1994), ‘Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness’,
Philosophical Perspectives 8: 189-206; reprinted as ch. 15 of Keefe and
Smith (1996).
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:3) 2021, Article no. 1
